revision 1.0
by ellie coyote (they/them)
The goal of this work is to develop a framework and set of concepts to analyze freedom, knowledge, and accountability. We are motivated to understand the interplay of these factors with the world, unfolding through physical laws and social norms.
Freedom in action is the ability to exercise discretion in the performance of the act—it is to choose. An action is any effect caused or perceived to be caused by an actor as a result of a choice. This perception is in the eye of the actor’s society. It does not matter whether the actor was physically able to create the effect or not, social effects resulting from the action will proceed regardless. Action is generally taken with respect to some goal: a future desired state of the world.
Surrounding and suffusing any action are constraints, which determine possible choices available to the actor, and effects, which determine results of an action. In the social world these constraints and effects are called norms, and in the physical world they are called physical laws. Actions take place against a physical and social configuration—that of matter, energy, information, social positions, others, and the self—which we call the “world-state.” The effects resulting from action result in the unfolding of a new world-state. Physical and normative constraints and effects are not essentially different, and real actions take place in a blurry and dynamic mixture of these idealizations.
Physical constraints govern choices available to an actor based on their physical position and the power available to them to manipulate the physical world. When a choice is made, some intended effect is held in mind, and when an actor takes action, its effects propagate through the world. Sometimes the world prevents that effect, revealing previously unknown constraints, sometimes the effect occurs as intended, and at other times a different and unintended effect obtains. The result of an action depends on the physical laws and on the physical world-state of matter, energy, and information. The relationship between the action and the new world-state is mediated by the actor’s knowledge.
Normative constraints determine the choices available to an actor based on their position in society, and normative effects are the actions taken by society in response to a choice of action. A society is any circle of others toward whom an actor is exposed in the course of acting, which can be anything from personal self-reflection up to any sized circle of other actors. Essentially, norms are determined by who the actor is within this society.
When an actor acts, this action will be judged by society with respect to the normative constraints surrounding who they are. As a result, others in society will act, producing an effect, which can contain both normative and physical components. A normative effect is a shift in the actor’s social position within the society producing the effect. Physical effects may be material rewards or punishments such as violence. Violence can come in many forms including bodily injury, psychological violence like shame, or economic violence like firing or other withholding of resources.
Societies tend to bundle norms into more or less flexible “roles,” and actors move into and out of these roles (or transform them) through the evolution of the social world-state. Roles are constructed of norms, and they contain assumptions defining who the person is that holds the role. The norms defining a role might be more or less codified and legible within the society in which it is defined, and they may be more or less rigid. Roles are configurations of the different kinds of actors within a society and their relationships of power, hierarchy, and obligation. Knowledge of their existence and of one’s own perceived role help make navigable and predictable the norms of a given society.
Roles circumscribe choices—they create social constraints. When an actor embodies a role within a certain society, then the effects of society on the actor in response to their actions will be governed by the norms constituting their roles and those of others.
The operation of psychological laws may be seen as a bridge between the physical and normative spheres. Mental and bodily states are influenced by physical processes. An actor’s emotions about themselves and others may be driven by the effects of norms. A moral qualm or emotional hangup may create a physical constraint or vice versa, and an actor may create physical effects due to their emotions or vice versa.
Perceptual illusions and cognitive biases can mediate the interaction between the mind and the world. Psychological constraints and effects come mixed together within the body of the actor.
Power is the ability to act. It is an arrangement of the world-state that affords an actor the ability to employ energy to make a change, and this may be physical or social energy. An action requires that the actor apply this power in a sufficient magnitude and way that will result in a change in the world-state that they desire. An actor’s knowledge of the world-state and of the applicable effects that may result from the release of energy informs the choices available to them.
Choices barred by the deficiency of power or due to a lack of knowledge create constraints to action. Where constraints deny the possibility of reaching a goal, an actor may engage in negotiation to rearrange the world-state in such a way that they have the power to act in pursuit of their goal.
Knowledge is the mental model of the world held by an actor. It holds their understanding of the current world-state as well as how the world progresses into future states. Knowledge informs an actor of the constraints to their action, given the power that they hold (and know about), the applicable effects that may result from action, and the likely future state given the operation of those effects. It offers to the actor the set of choices available. We recognize that, at any given moment, an actor’s knowledge has some form and limit. This is a component of the world-state that lies within their mind, which we will refer to as “knowledge-state.”
Correctness of knowledge concerns whether the actual future state matches the expectations of the actor. If either the knowledge of effects or current world-state is incorrect, then the resulting state will differ from that expected by the actor in a recognizable way. When knowledge is incomplete, even if it is correct, unknown effects or state may result in changes that the actor recognizes as differing from expectations. It is also possible that differences remain unrecognized. If so, we can say that the knowledge was correct within the scope of this action, but those differences might reveal themselves later such that the knowledge can be retrospectively judged as having been incorrect.
A given actor is a member of multiple societies, overlapping in themselves, and also in the others that they encounter. Knowledge of norms in a given society are revealed through interactions with others that are mediated by those norms. Through these interactions, an actor gains knowledge of the others that exist, their roles and the identities they present within that society. In the society of one’s self, one also interacts through the mediation of norms. Self-reflection through the varying lenses presented by norms and the peculiarities of their physical and psychological makeup offers the actor self-knowledge and allows them to establish their identity. In this sense, an identity is the self-reflexive assignment of norms, and possibly roles, to an actor’s self.
As the world unfolds from one state to the next, so too do the identities present within the various interacting societies of the actor. Any given recognition of the self or others is only ever momentary and incomplete, since understood norms and roles exist as ephemeral idealizations floating atop an ever-changing physical universe, clashing and contradicting themselves and one another amongst intersecting societies. Normative knowledge is incomplete and tenuous, and the moral implications of a given action, especially acts involving others, can seldom, if ever, be fully accounted for.
The same goes for the operation of physical laws, as no actor can know the total configuration of physical entities nor their infinitely-ordered effects. Perfect prediction of a future world-state can only occur when an actor holds correct and complete knowledge of both the current world-state and effects, and this is generally impossible.
The incorrectness and incompleteness of knowledge are its most important aspects. An action taken under some knowledge-state will produce effects that may result in a world-state aligned with the goals of the actor or not, but in either case there will be components of the world-state that do not match the expected world state because of the actor’s incomplete and incorrect knowledge. If we imagine an action performed over multiple identical (with respect to the observable world-state) “experiments,” the outcome will vary. This variance in the outcome may yet produce consistently successful action if it is small enough. It might even be small enough to escape notice. If the variance grows to a large enough size, however, it may indicate qualitatively different results to the actor or to others evaluating the action, even if it is nominally successful. A greater level of variance might produce effects that stray beyond the bounds of success.
“Skillfulness” is the disposition of an actor to perform an action in a way that requires less power than otherwise, the prior external world-state and result variance being equal. We allow skill to vary over internal world-state, which includes their knowledge-state and some bodily state. Skill does not really encompass gross or innate bodily variations, but more subtle, though nonetheless physical, differences that are obtained through practice. Because skill allows action requiring less power, then a skillful actor may be able to exercise choices in a world-state that a less skillful one may be constrained from acting upon.
“Expertise” is the ability of an actor to act within a relatively unconstrained prior world-state toward causing a low-variance resulting world-state. That is, in a world-state that affords an actor a great deal of freedom and discretion—a high-variance prior world-state, if you will—an actor with greater expertise may act to bring about a world-state with more predictable low-variance results compared to an actor with less expertise, the goals of action and external world-state being equal. Again, we allow expertise to vary with internal world-state, though for a given external world-state, expertise can allow an actor to more accurately and precisely apprehend the constraints to and applicable effects of action. Both skill and expertise may enable choices that are unavailable to an actor with less skill or expertise.
When rare within a given society for a given domain of action, skill and expertise are often associated with societal roles. They usually require a great deal of practiced action and incorporation of knowledge over a long time to cultivate. When skill or expertise in a certain domain are extremely common, their lack of presence in an individual also may result in the grant of a societal role—that of a disability. If these roles are incongruous with other roles held in society, conflicting with societal expectations of who should or should not hold or exercise a given skill or expertise, then social effects may impose constraints on the actor’s ability to act using their skill or expertise. In the case of disability, social reaction might allow or force an actor to act in the domain within which their specific disability cannot produce predictably low-variance results and may be unsuccessful.
An actor’s knowledge offers them the set of choices available. The known world-state along with their apprehension of physical laws and norms give them the landscape within which to make a choice toward reaching their goal. With respect to their next action, the actor may be more or less aware of the incompleteness of their knowledge, and expertise will generally give them a greater appreciation of it. They may approach the choice with an attitude that affirms, interrogates, or transgresses it.
When affirming their present state of knowledge, they act within known constraints and expect known effects from their action. If their knowledge is complete and correct enough, and they have the power to act, they might move unimpeded toward their goal. If not, then their goal may be hindered, and unintended effects may result. Either case may reveal new data to them, which might be incorporated into their knowledge.
When they act with an attitude of interrogation, an actor seeks to update their knowledge within a framework delineated by their existing knowledge-state. The action aims to uncover missing pieces of a partially complete puzzle, or fit together previously unreconciled knowledge and data.
A third attitude an actor may take is that of transgression. In this attitude there is doubt within them about their existing knowledge-state, the world-state, constraints, and known effects. What lies outside it may or may not have clear purchase within their mind—they might have a differing and irreconcilable view of reality, or they might be responding to an unarticulated sense of wrongness or lacking in their current knowledge-state. In any case, their transgressive action will violate known constraints, and this is almost by definition a willed attempt to negotiate the world-state.
An action taken with any of these attitudes might reveal new data to the actor. Turning this data into knowledge requires further steps, which we call “incorporation.”
Incorporation is action upon the actor’s own knowledge-state. When information is incorporated by the actor, their knowledge-state is altered. Incorporating information to progress to a new knowledge-state does not necessarily imply that the new state is correct. It might be more complete than before, but further information may reveal contradictions that may eventually necessitate a wholesale revision.
When an actor observes the results of an action or the effects of any occurrence in the world, data is revealed to them. When this data is purely what was already expected, no information is received. Thus, there is nothing to incorporate into and change the knowledge that they hold. In reality, the data almost always deviates from expectations, or unexpected components may have arisen. It has variance, and these variations are the data. However, to be information for the actor, and thus subject to incorporation, these differences must be noticed.
Notice can occur only when the actor exists in an appropriate world-state to discriminate the difference between the actual and expected world-states. This “appropriate world-state” may be the vantage point from which they observe, it may involve the existence of complex measuring devices, or perhaps they might need to occupy a certain social role to receive the data from others. Regardless, somehow the data must be made available to their senses. In addition, an appropriate prior knowledge-state must have equipped them with the ability to apprehend the difference. Even if the data is readily available to an actor’s senses, if they cannot distinguish the two world-states (actual vs. expected), then it will go unnoticed.
Once a difference is noticed, the actor may or may not appreciate the new information. Appreciation is the ability of the actor, in their existing knowledge-state, to imbue the information with meaning, and meaning is essential for incorporation. Without meaning, there is no place for the new information to fit within their knowledge. It cannot be articulated with other knowledge that the actor has. However, if the information has meaning, then it can generally be readily incorporated. They can fill an existing gap in their knowledge with the new information, completing the act of incorporation.
If the information cannot be appreciated and given meaning, it might be retained and eventually incorporated. In order to incorporate it they must negotiate their prior knowledge-state by performing further action. Some of these actions may be external, interrogating the world for more information. Internally, the actor may need to question and rearrange concepts and information within their mind. This may go on iteratively, and incorporation may occur after negotiating their existing knowledge-state into one that can give meaning to the information and provide a place into which it can be received.
Negotiation is a process of reorganizing the world-state to present a different set of choices. Through negotiation, who the actor is, what they know, or what power they have is transformed. Within a society they may gain, lose, or transform roles. Negotiation occurs through action, and these actions may be taken with any of the various attitudes. From this spectrum of potential actions, various outcomes may emerge. The resulting world-state may offer choices that are more or less suited to reaching the actor’s goals than before. They may find that their world is more constrained than before, offering fewer degrees of freedom within which to act, or they may be freer. The actor’s knowledge-state may or may not have been updated, and the new world-state may present less or greater uncertainty than before.
All types of negotiation are mediated by expertise. Expertise allows the actor to apprehend the constraints that the current world-state presents, given their knowledge of it and known effects. Greater expertise reveals to the actor the limits to knowledge as well as gaps in this edifice. Through clear apprehension of choices available to them, the actor may negotiate with the world to bring about a desired world-state that offers other choices, potentially those in which their skills are more suited. By pushing into the gaps through interrogation or transgression, they may create information to incorporate into knowledge or an alternate world-state that aligns to their vision.
Negotiation may occur through simple rearrangement to create new possibilities for action. The actor acts within known laws of nature and norms, making predictable changes to the world-state. If the resulting world-state has no noticeable unexpected components, then no information is created, and the negotiation is strictly a predictable rearrangement of the world that presents alternative choices. Actions taken during this kind of negotiation are of an affirmative attitude.
When negotiating with an affirmative attitude, there are other potential outcomes. The action may result in a world-state that was predicted by the actor, and they moved toward their goal in the intended way, but there are noticeable differences from the predicted world-state. On the other hand, the results of the action may be such that the world-state shifts to an unexpected new state, and the choices now available are not what the actor expected or intended. They have not approached their goal in the intended way. If the actor has violated an unknown constraint, the world of physical laws and society will respond all the same. These results will almost certainly have revealed information to the actor, which is subject to incorporation.
When acting to negotiate with an interrogative attitude, the approach is to attempt to update their knowledge of the world. This may be done through actions that probe the boundaries of existing constraints and refining their understanding of the effects that may result from action. These actions seek to create information that can then be incorporated into their knowledge-state and alter the available choices. The actions undertaken in this negotiation may result in violations of existing constraints, which may be intentional as the actor articulates their positions. The world will respond to these violations, and, if they are mild, then the actor may emerge more or less unscathed.
Interrogative negotiation, with the incorporation of information resulting from action into knowledge, is the predominant way in which the internal world-state of an actor is rearranged to cultivate skill and expertise.
When acting transgressively, an actor intentionally violates known constraints. They might be attempting to push the world-state toward another that they hold in mind—an aspirational world-state—with physical laws and norms they hold to be more true, or their actions might be an attempt to demonstrate the falseness of the constraints and effects presented to them by the world-state and held in their knowledge. The latter represents an aspirational world-state in which the constraint does not exist, or exists in a different or reduced form compared to prior to the negotiation.
Sometimes an actor’s deep expertise may be crucial, through their understanding of the prior world-state and of the gaps and seams within it that may be pushed to breaking, to impel them toward transgression. Other times, true naiveté—a lack of expertise—may be the factor that allows them to transgress, when expertise, through an appreciation of interconnections and attendant caution, would have stayed them.
The violation of a physical law may reveal that the law was not true at all, or it may have only been true under specific conditions, which the actor has altered. The resulting world-state might match that of the actor’s aspirations, or it might be unexpected. On the other hand, the actor may have been mistaken, and the physical law still holds for the conditions under which the violation was attempted, resulting in a reaction to reaffirm the prior world-state. Depending on the depth of violation and the strength of the law, the effects of this response might be damaging to the actor.
When a norm is violated, society’s reaction might be suspended, allowing the new state of affairs to exist. This might persist, or society might react to either nullify the new choices the actor intended to create for themself or violently—physically, psychologically, economically, or otherwise—re-establish the prior world-state. The reaction may be accompanied by a change in roles for the actor or others in society, and it may involve further physical constraint if the reaction was violent. In the persistence of either the new or old world-state, the constellation of norms surrounding the actor in society may have shifted. The actor might occupy different social roles than before, or find the roles themselves transformed, created, or destroyed.
Following the negotiation, the resulting world-state will reveal data to the actor, as the world-state presents differences from their aspirations and expectations. If this data can be appreciated, then it may be incorporated into their knowledge-state. It may happen that the psychology of the actor is such that it prevents them from noticing or appreciating any differences from their aspirational world-state. As the world-state continues to evolve, they may find their knowledge-state becoming increasingly incorrect, and this may present risks as they take further actions in this world, increasing the probability of failure. On the other hand, they may be able to maintain a flexible and clear-eyed perspective whilst continuing to negotiate the world-state, along with their knowledge-state, toward their aspiration.
The ability to carry out a transgressive negotiation depends on the strength and truth of the constraint that is violated and on the “transgressive power” of the actor. Once a constraint has been successfully violated, and the world has progressed to a new state, maintaining this new world-state also depends on power. An actor’s skill is a component of transgressive power since it may allow them to maintain the negotiation with less power, multiplying their abilities.
Power comes in both physical and social forms. Physical power is the ability to recruit and direct physical energy in a way and to the degree necessary to effect a desired change. In the transgressive mode, physical power must be able to push the physical world-state beyond its constraints and sufficient to hold it in this state. Social transgressive power contains the ability to suspend social reactions to one’s violation and to recruit others into filling the social positions and roles created by one’s aspirational world-state, thus cementing it into place.
Some constraints are light in nature and are easily swept aside. A superficial constraint may be shown not to have been limiting at all, or components not integral to an effect, though thought to be, might be removed. At the other extreme, constraints might be so fundamental to the physical laws of the universe or to the social fabric that no amount of power can result in their violation, or, if it can be violated, the reaction of the world is absolutely irresistible.
Between these extremes, even a strong constraint may be violated and a new world-state maintained if enough power can be recruited and applied to do so. A prerequisite for the application of power is a knowledge-state that indicates to the actor where, how, and to what magnitude power must be applied. Another is the recruitment of energy, and this can be physical energy or a social arrangement that grants the actor the power they need to accomplish their transgression. Beyond this, the new world-state may be irreversible, or it might require further actions from the spectrum of attitudes and the appropriate recruitment and application of power—both ordinary and transgressive—to maintain.
When we speak of “accountability” we include both its positive and negative orientations. An actor may be held to account when something goes well as a result of their actions as well as when it goes poorly. Accountability is a normative social effect that results from the outcome of an action when observed by others.
An action is taken before society, at a minimum in the society of the actor’s own self. This society judges their choice and its outcomes against the prior world-state, particularly the actor’s position within it—their knowledge-state, the power at their disposal, and the societal roles that they held. This retrospective view of the prior world-state is part of the present world-state, the past having left its indelible mark, and knowledge of it is imperfect. According to the norms of this society, some level of detail is required for accountability to occur, and more or less effort may be spent in interrogating the present to understand the past depending on this level. Both the actor and others may undertake negotiation and other actions to reveal, hide, or change knowledge of this prior world-state.
The basic operation of accountability is to alter the world-state surrounding the actor. This might be to add to or subtract from resources under their power, such that they are more or less able to effect future changes to the world. This can include physical access to materials, devices, or information, as well as economic powers which grant the social ability to direct resources toward some use. Normatively, the roles held by the actor in society might be changed, or the norms that they are expected or seen to conform to may be added to or subtracted from, possibly stretching the definition of the roles themselves. Finally, accountability may entail effects on the body of the actor, doing it violence or loosening or tightening its physical restraints.
With respect to the results of action for a given goal, the variance in the result can be an indicator of the “quality” of the action. When the deviation from the goal is negligibly small or imperceptible to the society of the action, the quality of action is high. When the intended goal is nominally achieved, but with high deviation, the quality of action is low. Finally, if the goal is not met at all, then the action can be said to have failed. When the quality of the result is subsequently observed by society, the prior position of the actor is interrogated.
The perceived relative constraint of the actor—how much freedom of choice they held—determines whether skill or expertise is of greater impact. If the actor was loosely constrained, then their expertise determines how well they can navigate an environment of greater freedom to achieve the goal. If the actor was tightly constrained and had few choices, then how skillfully they were able to employ the power available to them matters more.
In addition to the effects of pure luck, the quality of the result depends on the actor’s skill and expertise. Given the constraints and the amount of power available to them, these traits will determine whether the action succeeds or fails, and, if it succeeds, whether the result will be of high or low quality.
For accountability to take skill or expertise into account, society must recognize the actor to contain (or lack) these traits. The traits may be part of a societal role held by the actor. Society may recognize a gap, in that the traits exhibited are part of a role the actor was not recognized to have held, or that the actor held a role for which the trait was demonstrated to have been lacking.
Given the constraints, power, skill, and expertise the actor is perceived to have had, society can expect a certain quality in the result of their action. A deviation in quality may result in society responding by taking action on the actor. Others in society may add or remove resources from under their power, confer benefits, or commit violence on them. They may even grant or remove roles to remedy the gap between where the actor was previously positioned and where they have now demonstrated themself to be, and they will experience the attendant changes to their social and physical position.
Generally speaking, accountability for results proceeds within the existing framework of society. There is nothing transgressive about the action taken, and the existing order prevails, even as accountability alters the social and physical position of the actor within it.
To be accountable for a transgressive act, society must first recognize the act as transgressive in the first place. That is, the position of the actor, as recognized by society, must be seen to have constrained the actor against the action that they took. A non-transgressive act may, under further interrogation, eventually be seen to be transgressive, and vice versa. In any case, when society recognizes the act as a transgression of the constraints that were apparently in place, there are two basic responses. One is acceptance, allowing a reevaluation of society and the actor. The other is reaction, an attempt to reassert the constraints of the past into the present.
If society accepts the transgression, then it opens space for the reevaluation of norms and roles in society. A role that the actor was previously seen to hold may be redefined. They might also newly embody a role that was seen to be impossible for them to have held, thus redefining this newly acquired role. The new arrangement of norms may create space for others to fill roles that they were previously barred from or new roles that never existed before.
If society reacts to the transgression, the space for reevaluation remains closed. The norms previously constraining the actor are reasserted, if possible, in an effort to put the actor back into their previous position. If it is impossible to return to the prior world-state, or in addition to such a reset, others may render violence upon the actor as an effect of accountability.
As to which form of accountability society takes, acceptance or reaction, there are several factors at play. It is clear that access to power often accompanies the roles held by an actor. Thus, reaction is often driven by those others whose positions will see a diminution of power. In opposition to this is the power exercised by the actor and the amount that they hold following the transgression. Their transgressive power to make real the world-state of their aspiration or to bring about the active questioning and destruction of the prior order determined whether the act could occur. The power they hold and may potentially exercise following the act, including physical power now at their disposal and social power (realized or potential) to recruit others to uphold their aspirational world-state, influences whether society can be forced to accept the transgression.
When society accepts a transgression without being forced, it is often because the new world-state is seen as “harmless” to the powers of others in society. In the case of a small transgression this is often the case. Over time, the piling up of many “small, harmless” transgressions by one or more actors can result in actually significant shifts in the power and positions of actors in society (in analyzing social change, actors may be grouped into “classes” whose fortunes tend to rise and fall together), but at this point it might be too late for reaction and the new arrangement of powers must be accepted. Sometimes this is predicted (accurately or not) by others in society, who, if they are positioned to do so, create strong reactions to stamp out even “small, harmless” transgressions.
During interrogation of the prior world-state, society asks of itself and the actor, “Who were they?” (or “Who was I?”) when they made their choice of action. The answer to this is an articulation of the constellation of norms surrounding and suffusing the actor within the society under consideration, as well as the roles they held. This question is coupled with the question asked of that prior world-state, “What was going on?” and again of the actor, “What did they know?” These questions must necessarily be asked through the lens of the present world-state, from which we have the questions “Who are they now?” (“Who am I?”) and “Where do things stand now?”
The questions relevant to accountability arise from these, “Can who they were then become who they are now? Can the way the world evolved from its prior state adequately explain this change?” When the transformation that the actor undergoes is purely affirmative, it is within the norms and expected effects of the prior and current world-state for the actor to have changed from who they were to their present self. If there is accountability in this case, it is accountability for the results of the action, and, indeed, this accountability for results is a prominent driver of the change in norms that effected the transformation. When, on the other hand, the transformation comes about through a transgressive action, accountability for it follows the paths—acceptance or reaction—described above.
Starting with freedom of choice, we defined action as the effects caused by an actor in the judgement of an observing society. Societies consist of sets of others and the actor’s self. A given society may include only the reflexive self, it may consist entirely of others, or it may include some combination of the two. The ideas of constraints and effects were presented next, which surround and influence the actor’s choice.
To understand how constraints and effects operate upon the actor, we elucidate the concept of knowledge and describe how it may evolve based on the interplay of the actor, the attitude with which they act, and their world. We introduced skill and expertise, which, along with the concepts of power and variance, provide bounds for the results of action as well as inform the constraints that the actor acts within.
Negotiation is then explored, which is a way for an actor to reorganize the world. The most important subset of negotiations is that which is taken with a transgressive attitude, wherein the actor intentionally violates known constraints. The success of these negotiations is generally dependent on the correctness of knowledge, especially as it pertains to the physical world. Of the normative world, however, almost anything may be rewritten. The social “transgressive power” of the actor and the power of others who may react to the act determines whether the negotiation may hold in this case.
Finally, we describe accountability. Several facets of accountability are expounded upon, which align with the affirmative and transgressive attitudes available to the actor. We also briefly touch on the concept of self-transformation and its associated implications for accountability.
We intentionally avoided analysis or examples in the presentation of this framework. This was done to provide as concise and streamlined presentation as possible, and to avoid meandering through the thicket of complications that may arise in applying it to concrete systems or deeper analytical results. These will be explored in later works. No doubt we will uncover difficulties and refinements to the framework presented here, and we will return to it for revision as needed.